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Abstract
Existing political economy models rely on inter-industry dierences such as factor endow-
ment or factor specicity to explain the politics of trade policy-making. However, this paper
nds that a large proportion of variation in U.S. applied tari rates in fact arises within indus-
try. I oer a theory of trade liberalization that explains how product dierentiation in economic
markets leads to rm-level lobbying in political markets. I argue that while high product dier-
entiation eliminates the collective action problem exporting rms confront, political objections
to product-specic liberalization will decline due to less substitutability and the possibility of
serving foreign markets based on the norms of reciprocity. To test this argument, I construct
a new dataset on lobbying by all publicly traded manufacturing rms after parsing all 838,588
lobbying reports led under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. I nd that productive export-
ing rms are more likely to lobby to reduce taris, especially when their products are suciently
dierentiated. I also nd that highly dierentiated products have lower tari rates. The results
challenge the common focus on industry-level lobbying for protection.
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What makes trade liberalization possible? This has been a central question in the study of politics
of trade policy. Over the last several decades, much progress has been made in understanding
how countries can achieve trade liberalization even when they have strong incentives to protect
domestic markets.1 We know, for example, that international institutions (Keohane, 1984; Bagwell
and Staiger, 1999), global supply chain (Milner, 1987), delegation of negotiation authority to the
executives (Bailey et al., 1997), and political motivation (Maggi and Rodr guez-Clare, 2007) all play
a role. However, a vast majority of both theoretical and empirical research on domestic politics
of international trade either implicitly or explicitly assumes that the underlying individual trade
preferences that drive these forces are shaped by how trade aects their income, which is tied
directly to the industry they serve. That is, trade policy preferences of individuals diverge across
industry (e.g., Rogowski, 1987; Hiscox, 2002).
This paper is motivated by some consistent empirical patterns that I nd in the U.S. that
contradict the industry-level explanations. First, I nd that overall tari dierences occur largely
within industries across similar products, the level at which taris are actually set. For example, as
of 2013, the applied most favoured nation (MFN) tari rate for Cotton, not carded or combed,
having staple length of 28.575 mm or more but under 34.925 mm (HS8 52010038) is 31.4
cents/kg ( 14%), whereas Cotton, not carded or combed, having a staple length under
19.05 mm (3/4 inch), harsh or rough (HS8 52010005) is duty free.2 The tari on Flashlights
(HS8 85131020) is 12.5% while that of Portable electric lamps designed to function by
their own source of energy, other than flashlights (HS8 85131040) is 3.5%. Second, rms,
rather than industry as a whole, individually lobby on trade policies targeting very specic prod-
ucts. This suggests that trade policy preferences of rms in the same industry diverge. Despite
these, we know relatively little about how politics aects the distribution of taris across products
within industry (see Gowa and Kim (2005); Goldstein and Gulotty (2014) for notable exceptions.).
I argue that rm-level lobbying is an important determinant of product-specic liberalization,
1 See Bagwell and Staiger (1999) for how the terms-of-trade externality creates an incentive to increase trade
barriers. Grossman and Helpman (1994) characterizes the conditions under which governments protect domestic in-
dustries even without the terms-of-trade incentives. Guisinger (2013) nds that white Americans are more supportive
of trade protection when they are in racially diverse communities because of redistributive concerns.
2 Ad-Valorem Equivalents of non Ad-Valorem Taris are calculated based on UNCTAD Method 1, which is \a
three-step method for estimating unit values: (1) from tari line import statistics of the market country available
in TRAINS; then (if (1) is not available) (2) from the HS 6-digit import statistics of the market country from UN
COMTRADE; then (if (1) and (2) are not available) (3) from the HS 6-digit import statistics of all OECD countries.
Once a unit value is estimated, then it is used for all types of rates (MFN, preferential rates, etc)."
1and in particular, of high within-industry policy variation. To analyze political incentives of rms,
I extend the theoretical framework of the new-new trade theory (e.g., Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz,
2003) to include political interaction between rms and government. In order to allow for within
industry heterogeneity, I extend the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model by introducing rm-
level dierences in their productivity. I show that it is both economically and politically optimal to
reduce taris on dierentiated products (dened as less substitutable goods).3 My argument diers
from the theory of endogenous protection which identies the conditions under which rms intensify
their lobbying activity for protection (Hillman, 1982; Mayer, 1984; Baldwin, 1985; Magee et al.,
1989; Treer, 1993). Although it is well known that governments reduce trade barriers responding
to the interests of exporting industries/rms (Schattschneider, 1935; Milner, 1987; Destler and
Odell, 1987; Milner and Yoe, 1989; Gilligan, 1997a; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000), existing studies
are unable to predict which rms within industry are more or less likely to lobby, when they lobby,
and which products get lower taris. That is, few theoretical and empirical studies identify the
conditions under which lobbying on product specic liberalization is successful.
My theory provides the microfoundations of the argument that exporting rms lobby for free
trade (Milner, 1988a; Gilligan, 1997b; Ya sar, 2013).4 Specically, I focus on the eects of product
dierentiation on product-specic trade liberalization by examining the strategic interaction be-
tween rms and government. First, I argue that product dierentiation eliminates the collective
action problem exporting rms confront because only a small number of rms actually trade specic
products on which governments set tari. Thus, the rm's lobbying decision is an endogenous re-
sponse to their own cost-benet calculation rather than a collective problem at the industry level.5
Second, product dierentiation mitigates domestic rms' perceived threats of foreign competition
compared to when their products are completely substitutable by cheaper foreign products. Finally,
product dierentiation increases the level of intra-industry trade, which subsequently encourages
rms to strategically lobby for open trade on the basis of the norms of reciprocity.
To estimate the eect of product dierentiation on rm level lobbying and trade liberalization,
I construct a rm-level lobbying dataset based on 838,588 lobbying reports led under the Lob-
bying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995. For each lobbying report, I identify the rms lobbying for
3 Throughout this paper, I use product dierentiation and less substitutability interchangeably.
4 Ya sar (2013) makes an important empirical contribution by showing that exporting rms are politically inuential
in trade policy-making based on evidence from 27 Eastern European and Central Asian countries.
5 Gilligan (1997b) shows that protection becomes a private good when rms engage in monopolistic competition.
He nds that industries with large intra-industry trade tend to request more protection due to less severe collective
action problems. Contrarily, I argue that product dierentiation mitigates the threat that import-competing rms
face, and thus results in less demand for protection.
2any trade bills introduced since 1999 (from 106th Congress: both the Senate and the House of
Representatives). I then use nancial databases (e.g., Compustat and Orbis) to obtain economic
data for those rms. I show that productive rms are more likely to lobby on trade policy only
when they compete in industries with dierentiated products. I also analyze the content of trade
bills that have been introduced since 1999 (from 106th to 113th Congress). Consistent with my
theory, I nd that rms individually lobby to reduce trade barriers on highly specic products. By
emphasizing the importance of rm-level political activities and their subsequent eects on trade
liberalization, this paper contributes to the empirical literature on the domestic politics of trade
policy-making (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Manseld and Mutz, 2009; L u et al., 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the large within industry
variation and discusses the limits of existing studies. Section 3 theoretically discusses why a high
level of product dierentiation implies trade liberalization. Empirical results will be presented in
Section 4. The nal section concludes.
2 Inconsistencies between Existing IPE Models and Trade Flows
This section undertakes an empirical analysis of taris and trade ows of the U.S. at the product
level. I nd that most of the variation in tari rates can be explained by dierences in taris for
products within the same industry. This is in contrast to existing theories which generally focus
on conicts of interests across factor owners or industries (e.g., Rogowski, 1987; Hiscox, 2002). I
revisit the validity of two dominant theories of trade policy formation. I then review the recent
development of the new-new trade theory to motivate the study of rm-level political activity.6
2.1 Product-level Trade Policy Variation within Industry
With sophisticated global consumer tastes and the development of production technology, inter-
national trade has increased not only in volume but also in the variety of goods. There are more
than 17,000 internationally traded products on which countries set distinct taris and non-tari
barriers.7 Krugman (1980) showed how consumer's love of variety creates new gains of trade inde-
pendent from the conventional source of comparative advantage. This paper examines the political
6 This paper focuses on the theoretical implication of the new-new trade theory on rm-level political incentives.
There is a large literature on the importance of rms in international political economy (e.g., Milner, 1988b; Chase,
2004; Manger, 2005; Broz and Ploue, 2010; Weymouth and Broz, 2013). I make no attempt to oer an exhaustive
list of the literature.
7 For the U.S., there are approximately 9,000 distinct exporting goods (Schedule B) and 17,000 imported products
(HTS) used for export/import documentation.
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Figure 1: Large Within-Industry Variance in Applied Tari Rates of the U.S.: This
gure demonstrates that a signicant proportion ( 70%) of the current variance in MFN (Most
Favored Nation) tari rates of the U.S. can be explained by the variation in tari rates within
industries, rather than variation across industries. It also illustrates that most tari reduction, as
a result of Uruguay Round negotiation, occurred across products within industry. This suggests
that industry-level analysis is no longer adequate to explain trade policy-making, especially for
developed countries like the U.S. Note that mathematically, the within industry variance plus the
between industry variance sums up to the total variance.
implication of high product dierentiation in the U.S., a country that is commonly used as a testing
ground for endogenous protection literature. Specically, I compare and contrast the political in-
centives of rms to identify the conditions under which lobbying on product-specic liberalization
is successful.
We now demonstrate that variation of trade policy within industries comprises most of the
variation in tari rates. Thus, I decompose the overall variation in applied tari rates in each year
into a within industry and a between industry component.8 Figure 1 shows that within industry
component accounts for most of the total variation in U.S. taris.9 The dierence in variation is
most noticeable after the Uruguay Round negotiation, which resulted in major tari reductions.
This calls into question the adequacy of relying on industry-level variation to explain trade policy-
making in developed countries. To the extent that trade policy is endogenously determined by
8 The total variance is decomposed into within and between component such that Tt = Wt + Bt. We cal-
culate each component by Tt =
1
Nt
P
HS2
P
i2HS2 (it   t)
2, Wt =
1
Nt
P
HS2
P
i2HS2 (it   HS2;t)
2, and Bt =
1
Nt
P
HS2 NHS2;t (HS2;t   t)
2 where Harmonized System 8 digits level products (HS8) are indexed by i and time by
t; industry is denoted by 2-digits Harmonized System Chapters (HS2); Nt and NHS2;t denote the overall number of
products and the products within each industry HS2; it, HS2;t and t are the applied tari rates, the average tari
rates within each industry, and the overall average of tari rates across all products, respectively.
9 Using dierent levels of aggregation for industry such as HS4 and HS6 results in essentially the same result:
high variation across products within industry.
4NAICS HS4 (HS6) HS8 Description MFN tari
20089910 Avocados 10.6 cents/kg
3114 2008
20089913 Banana pulp 3.4%
20089915 Bananas (other than pulp) 0.8%
20089925 Dates 22.4%
(Fruit and vegetable (Fruits, nuts and other 20089929 Grapes 7.0%
preserving edible parts of plants, 20089930 Guavas 0%
and specialty otherwise prepared or 20089940 Mangoes 1.5 cent/kg
food manufacturing) preserved) 20089960 Plums 11.20%
20089980 Pulp of fruit 9.60%
20089990 Fruit, nesi 6.00%
Table 1: Variation in applied most favored nation (MFN) tari rates: This table illustrates
that there exists large variation in MFN applied tari rates of the U.S. even in the same industry
(canned-fruit industry) as of 2013. It also shows that highly dierentiated products tend to have
lower tari barriers (the ad-valorem equivalence of 1.5cent/kg for HS8 20089940 is about 1.1%
based on the UNCTAD Method 1. See footnote 2 for the method). Applied tari rates are from
WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution).
political dynamics, the pattern observed in the U.S. suggests that rms might dier in their trade
policy preferences even within the same industry depending on which products they produce.10
Indeed, the level of trade barriers dier across fairly similar products in the U.S.. Table 1 shows the
large variation in taris across products even within a narrowly dened canned-fruits manufacturing
industry.
Explaining this variation is important although researchers have increasingly played down the
signicance of Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied tari rates of the U.S., due in large part to its
low overall mean ( 3:89%). First, countries spend enormous resources on negotiating tari rates
at this level of disaggregation, reecting diverse domestic and foreign interests in the policy making
process. For example, trade representatives of South Korea engaged in lengthy negotiation eorts
to reduce current tari barriers of the U.S. even when both countries already enjoy MFN status
as members of the WTO (World Trade Organization). Second, 60% of products are still dutiable
(i.e., positive taris), and the mean applied MFN tari rate for dutiable products is ( 7:27%).
According to International Trade Commission, the tari revenue is estimated to be $31 billion in
FY 2012, which is comparable to the amount that the U.S. spent on foreign aid ($23 billion) and
foreign military assistance ($14 billion) combined. Finally, taris can function as an important
foreign policy tool. For example, Carnegie (2013) nds that the U.S. used its taris to pressure
10 This is starkly dierent from the pattern observed in developing countries. For example, a same analysis shows
that between industry component explains more than 80% of total variation in China. The large between-component
in China is consistent with the prediction of industry-level theories, i.e., diverging preferences across industries. This
paper focuses on the trade policy-making of industrialized nations.
5Vietnam to improve its human rights record until it joined the WTO in 2006. As such, a deeper
understanding of product specic trade policy making on taris is needed.
I argue that the existing theoretical frameworks with their primary focus on inter-industry
variation inadequately explain the politics of trade policy making. For example, the U.S. exports
and imports each product in Table 1, and similar factors of production are used to produce these
products.11 This makes it dicult to determine whether the products belong to an exporting in-
dustry or import-competing industry, or whether they are capital or labor intensive goods. Clearly,
neither sectoral nor factoral models can explain variations in these taris. Below, I provide further
evidence of the limits of the existing frameworks in explaining trade policy-making of the U.S.
based on some inconsistencies between the theoretical frameworks and actual trade ows of the
U.S.
2.2 Factor-based Model (Heckscher-Ohlin)
The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts political cleavages will arise between owners of dierent
factors of production. Countries endowed with high-skilled labor, for instance, will have class con-
ict between high-skilled and low-skilled laborers because trade liberalization will have dierential
eects on their factor prices. Goods will equalize the factor prices across countries through trade,
decreasing the wages of low-skilled labor with the imports from a country that is endowed abun-
dantly with the same type of labor (i.e., lower factor prices for low-skilled labor). This perspective
has laid an important theoretical foundation for understanding the domestic political cleavages
within countries (Rogowski, 1987).12
However, Figure 2 suggests that the trade pattern of the U.S. is inconsistent with the factor-
based theory. Contrary to the factoral theory, which predicts large trade ows from/to middle
and low wage countries (shaded region), the imports and exports of the U.S. (a country relatively
abundant in high-skilled labor) have been dominated by products from the high and medium wage
countries. More importantly, the top panel shows that a large number of products originate in
countries with highly dierent factor prices (circles inside the triangles). This is striking because
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem does not hold if the same product is produced by countries with
11 By using disaggregated industry-level trade data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Pinto and Weymouth (2013)
estimated that this industry (NAICS 3114) is one of the most capital-intensive industries.
12 Moreover, the factor-based theories have been also useful in examining the relationship between political in-
stitutions and trade policies. In general, democratic countries are hypothesized to have more open trade policies
than autocracies since their median voters, whose factor of production tends to reect the country's abundant factor,
would gain from trade liberalization (e.g., Manseld et al., 2002; Milner and Kubota, 2005).
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Figure 2: Inconsistencies Between Heckscher-Ohlin Model and Actual Trade Flows:
This gure shows that the main sources (destinations) of the U.S. imports (exports) are high and
medium wage countries. This is in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which predicts that
most trade ows should be in the shaded region, i.e., from/to medium or low wage countries. Each
vertex of the triangles represents countries with dierent factor prices for labor: high, medium,
and low. Each circle represents a HS6 product with the size proportional to the total value of
trade. The location of each circle represents the distribution of source/destination country types.
For example, a circle at the center of the triangle means that 1/3 of the product is from/to high,
medium, and low wage countries at the same time. Each country's wage level is calculated based
on the level of GDP per capita (GDPPC) adjusted by their purchasing power parity: low wage
countries have GDPPC levels less than the 20th percentile ( $2;000); high wage nations have
GDPPC higher than the 70th percentile ( $10;000); and medium wage countries are in between.
Note that China is responsible for the increasing imports from the medium wage country in recent
years. Bilateral trade data is from UN Comtrade. GDPPC data is from Penn World Tables 7.0
dierent factor endowments.13 In fact, trade ows should be concentrated only at the bottom two
vertices according to the logic of the theorem. The fact that a large number of products are located
either inside the triangle or along the northwest edge implies that factor ownership alone cannot
explain the patterns of trade liberalization since it is unclear to which direction their factor prices
would move.
13 Factor price equalization is found to hold even in the case of more goods than factors (Dixit and Norman, 1980;
Feenstra, 2003). As such, this theoretical result is implicitly assumed in the literature.
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Figure 3: Inconsistencies Between Ricardo-Viner Model and Actual Trade Flows: The
box plots of Grubel{Lloyd index for the top 20 exporting industries of the U.S. for each year
underscore that the level of intra-industry trade even within exporting industries has steadily
increased over time. The level of intra-industry trade for each manufacturing industry (at SIC 4
digits) is calculated based on a modied version of Grubel{Lloyd index:  
exp imp
exp+imp. The red dotted
line (zero) in the vertical axis indicates the highest level of intra-industry trade while the two
other extremes (-1 and 1) correspond to the industries with only exports and imports, respectively.
The top 20 exporting industries are separately identied by the total value of trade for each year
(freight-on-board value for imports).
2.3 Sector-based Model (Ricardo-Viner)
The Ricardo-Viner theory is also limited because sectoral divide between exporting and import-
competing industry becomes unclear with high degrees of intra-industry trade. The specic-factors
model predicts political cleavages across industries assuming completely immobile factors of pro-
duction (at least in the short-term). From this perspective, exporting industries generally prefer
trade liberalization while import-competing industries seek protection. However, the argument
breaks down when intra-industry trade is high.14
Figure 3 shows that the degree of intra-industry trade in U.S. trade has increased signicantly
across time. The U.S. now imports as much as it exports the products within top 20 exporting
14 I use the following a modied version of the widely used Grubel{Lloyd index: 
exp imp
exp+imp: Intra-industry trade is
highest when the index is equal to zero. As an example, suppose that the total value of trade (import + export) for
an industry is 100. Conventionally, researchers have categorized the industry as an exporting (import-competing)
industry if \most" of the value 100 is from exports (imports). However, the distinction between exporting versus
import-competing industries becomes problematic when countries simultaneously export and import goods (50-50),
i.e., there is a large amount of intra-industry trade. The conventional Grubel{Lloyd index is dened as 1 
jexp impj
exp+imp .
The modied version is used to distinguish exports from imports as well as the degree of intra-industry trade, e.g.,
(100-0) versus (0-100) cases.
8industries. It also shows that the level of variation has decreased over time. The results in Fig-
ure 3 cast doubt on many empirical studies in the eld of IPE that dichotomize import-competing
versus exporting industries. For instance, Hiscox (2002) measures the trade policy preferences of
legislators based on total production in the xed \10 leading exporting and import-competing in-
dustries in each year as a proportion of the state income." However, the U.S. increasingly imports
products even in its top export industries, while it also exports products that import-competing
rms produce. Thus, legislators may not prefer a pro-liberalization policy when rms within their
state produce a large volume of goods within the top exporting industries, because those rms may
actually be import-competing. Analysis at the rm level is necessary in order to correctly identify
the heterogeneous political interests.15
2.4 Firm-based Model (New-New Trade Theory)
The high volume of trade between countries with similar factor endowments (intra-industry trade)
goes against the predictions of both factor and sector-based theories. To address the inconsistency,
new trade theory models were developed to show that increasing returns to scale, imperfect com-
petition, and product dierentiation can explain the increasing intra-industry trade (Helpman and
Krugman, 1985; Krugman, 1979, 1980).16 First, the access to bigger foreign markets allows rms to
take advantage of large-scale production. Consequently, the average cost of production will decline
as the output increases when they serve bigger markets (i.e., increasing returns to scale).17 For
example, both the U.S. and South Korea exchange cars because rms in each country can increase
output and enjoy the gain in eciency by selling their products in both markets. Second, an im-
portant technical implication of increasing returns to scale is that trade models can no longer rely
on the assumption of perfect competition. This is because rms now have dierent market power
with dierent average cost charging dierent prices for similar products, i.e., prices of cars are all
dierent although they should be same under perfect competition. Finally, product dierentiation
is one of the most important microfoundation of intra-industry trade. Countries exchange similar
goods because each market is populated with consumers with dierent tastes. For example, some
15 Leading empirical analysis such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) rely on
industry level (SIC4) data. They nd that industries with high import-penetration lobby more and receive protection.
16 Helpman and Krugman (1985) considers a theoretical framework within which both inter- and intra-industry
trade can be analyzed. Bernard et al. (2007b) oer a general equilibrium model that have both rm-level heterogeneity
in productivity and dierent country-level factor abundance.
17 Economic theories have examined the eect of increasing returns to scale both external and internal to the
rm (Ethier, 1982). This paper focuses on the increasing returns to scale internal to the rm by allowing rm-level
productivity dierences. Usually, increasing returns to scale arise rms can spread their xed cost over a larger
output. The eciency gain is greater when rms are more productive with lower marginal cost of production.
9people like to drive 3000cc sedans while others prefer pickup trucks. Simply put, consumers \love
variety."
Although successful in explaining the high volume of intra-industry trade, new trade theory is
still limited in explaining why some rms are successful in engaging in international trade while
others are not (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). New-new trade theory was developed to explain the
vast dierences across rms in their levels of trade engagement (e.g., Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz,
2003). It predicts that productivity plays a key role in determining rm-level heterogeneity in
exporting. Specically, productive rms, with lower marginal costs of production, can reduce their
average cost by serving foreign markets (increasing returns to scale). In addition, their productivity
dierence will result in dierent market power whereby more productive rms can charge lower
prices on their goods (imperfect competition). In new-new trade theory, each rm produces a
dierentiated product, which implies that more varieties will be available after trade liberalization
(product dierentiation).18 The advent of rm-level micro data has pushed the framework further
to empirically examine the signicance of rm-level productivity. Now, there exists ample empirical
evidence of productivity dierences across rms within industry. In particular, more productive
rms tend to be bigger, pay higher wages to employees, and make larger prots. Moreover, only a
very small number of rms engage in international trade. That is, both exporters and importers
are rare, and they tend to be productive (Bernard et al., 2007a; Eaton et al., 2011).19
I focus on the distributional consequences of the new-new trade theory at the rm-level. Al-
though new-new trade theory can account for economic heterogeneity across rms within industry,
its theoretical analysis of market is predicated upon the assumption that trade policy is exogenous
to political interaction between rms and government. Moreover, if product dierentiation alone is
driving policy outcomes, one should expect more variability between industries as products become
less and less substitutable as they belong to dierent industries (Broda and Weinstein, 2006).20
This is in contrast to the large variation in taris within industry as shown in Figure 1. I argue
that it is rm-level political activities that endogenously determines trade policy outcomes. This
paper makes both theoretical and empirical contribution to the fast-growing rm-based research of
international trade policy within the framework of the new-new trade theory (Bombardini, 2008;
Osgood, 2012; Ploue, 2012).21
18See Bernard et al. (2011) for an extension of new-new trade theory to incorporate multiproduct rms.
19 There is mixed evidence on whether trade liberalization leads to productivity increase (e.g., Clerides et al., 1998;
Van Biesebroeck, 2005). Examining this is beyond the scope of this paper.
20Technically, the elasticity of substitution should be lower as products are more aggregated.
21 Bombardini (2008) is the rst that incorporates rm-level heterogeneity into a political economy model. Her
103 Theory
This section shows that rms may have more concentrated political interests regarding trade policy
than an industry as a whole when products are suciently dierentiated. First, I discuss how
product dierentiation fundamentally changes political incentives of rms. Second, I introduce a
formal model to analyze the strategic interaction between rms and government under product
dierentiation. I nd that lobbying by productive exporting rms, accompanied by the absence of
objections by rms who only serve the domestic market, can shift trade policies in the direction of
open trade especially when products are highly dierentiated.
3.1 Product Dierentiation
Product dierentiation decreases exporting rms' free-riding incentives, while also reducing the
potential threat that import-competing rms face from foreign competition. The logic is as follows:
1) The cost of international trade is high; only a small number of productive rms can bear the
cost. Thus, the benets of lobbying for trade liberalization accrue only to the small number of rms
that actually produce the dierentiated products in question; 2) in contrast, because consumers
cannot easily substitute one good for another, rms that only produce goods domestically face less
threat to their survival because they can still secure a certain market share with the introduction
of foreign products; 3) nally, product dierentiation increases the level of intra-industry trade,
which subsequently encourages productive rms to strategically lobby for open trade on the basis
of the norms of reciprocity. Simply put, exporting rms see more concentrated benets while
import-competing rms have more dispersed losses with higher levels of product dierentiation.
This paper argues that product dierentiation increase exporting rms' inuence in the tari-
setting process by directly comparing the incentives between exporting and import-competing rms
within the same industry. This is in contrast to the existing literature on the domestic determinants
of trade policy which assumes that conicts of interest divide consumers and producers: free trade
leads to gains for consumers and losses for domestic producers. In this regard, it has been generally
assumed that import-competing rms are privileged actors in the tari-setting process because they
can more easily solve the collective-action problem that lobbying creates than can consumers. The
assumption has been justied by the severe costs of existing market from the perspective of import-
competing rms (Hillman, 1982). Product dierentiation alters these political dynamics.
study focuses on the structure of protection across sectors rather than products. Osgood (2012) makes an important
theoretical contribution to the study of diverging economic preferences across rms. My research is dierent from
his with a focus on political interaction between rms and government.
11Collective Action Problem Less Free-Riding
Product
Dierentiation
Figure 4: Mitigated Collective Action Problem: This gure illustrates the logic by which
product dierentiation mitigates collective action problems that rms face. That is, rms have
more concentrated interests to inuence trade policy. Each square plate represents a product with
a distinct tari rate while each ball corresponds to a rm that produces the product.
First, product dierentiation mitigates collective action problems that exporting rms confront.
This is because a very small number of productive rms actually engage in international trade
(Olson, 1971); 3.1% of all rms in the U.S. export while 2.2 percent of rms import.22 It is
important to note that exporters tend to be importers as well: more than 50 percent of the rms
that import also export and these rms account for about 90 percent of U.S. trade (Bernard et al.,
2005). Moreover, the legal tari lines are becoming increasingly ne-grained with high degrees of
product dierentiation. For instance, the U.S. had about 8,600 unique products with distinct tari
rates in 1989. It now has over 17,000 products at the legal tari line as of 2011. Taris are set at
a highly specic product level, and there are very few rms that produce the product in question.
As such, productive rms want to reduce trade barriers when they 1) enter the foreign market, 2)
import products back to their home country through global production chain, and/or 3) import
intermediate goods for production. Figure 4 graphically shows the relationship between product
dierentiation and mitigation of the collective action problem.
Second, with product dierentiation, domestic rms are less likely to oppose open trade be-
cause consumer's love of variety implies that import-competing rms can still secure some domestic
market share. Thus, compared to the case where goods are perfectly substitutable (i.e., not dier-
entiated), whereby cheap foreign products might replace domestic products, rms face relatively
less threat of being forced out of the market if goods are less substitutable (dierentiated). As a
result, rms will not actively lobby for protection unless the costs of lobbying are less than the
benets, conditional on their likely survival in the face of trade liberalization. Figure 5 illustrates
this argument.
22Many rms import intermediate goods for manufacturing or to distribute nal goods to the domestic market.
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Figure 5: Reduced Threat Perception of Import-Competing Firms: This gure graphically
compares the levels of perceived threat posed by foreign competition as a function of product dier-
entiation. The left panel shows that when goods are substitutable, domestic rms are threatened
by foreign competition. Contrarily, the right panel illustrates that less substitutability implies the
possibility of import-competing rms staying in the market under trade liberalization. Increased
colorization of balls represents increased product dierentiation.
Finally, product dierentiation creates a political environment in which rms can strategically
use the norms of reciprocity. Specically, productive rms can pressure their home government to
ensure reciprocal tari reduction in foreign markets. This is because high product dierentiation
accompanies more intra-industry trade as foreign consumers want dierent varieties. Therefore, the
use of norms of reciprocity will create a feedback loop to reduce trade barriers both at home and
abroad as illustrated in Figure 6. That is, rms would oppose trade liberalization less in hopes of
increasing their foreign market share conditional on reciprocal reduction of foreign trade barriers.
Domestic Market Foreign Market
Demand for Reciprocal Liberalization
Demand for Liberalization
Figure 6: Strategic Use of the Norms of Reciprocity: This gure illustrates the use of norms of
reciprocity by domestic producers with product dierentiation. When there exists demands for open
trade, domestic rms can pressure domestic government to ensure foreign market liberalization.
That is, domestic rms will oppose trade liberalization less conditional on reciprocal reduction of
barriers abroad.
Note that this logic is dierent from conventional understanding of the norms of reciprocity
13applied to products across industries, e.g., reducing taris on agricultural products in return for
liberalizing passenger cars. That is, I argue that there exists political pressures to reciprocally
reduce trade barriers on products within the same industry. This accounts for the taris reduction
on automobile products as an outcome of the U.S.{Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The U.S.
car makers have become in favor of the FTA contrary to popular belief that they would strongly
oppose it. The statement from Sander M. Levin (D-MI) demonstrates that reciprocity played an
important role.
\Fortunately, last year, with the support of Members of Congress, including Chair-
man Camp, the automakers and the United Auto Workers, the Obama Administration
negotiated an additional agreement that will provide U.S. automakers with a real op-
portunity to compete and succeed in the Korean market. With the changes achieved
through the additional agreement, the U.S. auto industry (Ford, Chrysler, GM and the
UAW) are supporting the U.S.-Korea FTA."
3.2 The Model
The political economy model presented in this section combines an oligopolistic competition model
under product dierentiation with the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model. First, I show that
intra-industry trade increases with product dierentiation: some rms export while others compete
with foreign rms even within the same industry. I then examine the strategic interaction between
rms and government and the role of lobbying in making trade policy. The theory I propose in this
section will explain why both domestic and foreign rms should be understood as political agents
who can aect trade policy through their strategic interaction with governments.23
I analyze the behavior of rms under the following scenario. A representative consumer max-
imizes the utility function given in equation (1).24 The utility function incorporates the level of
product dierentiation in an industry through the parameter 0    1, where lower  implies a
higher degree of product dierentiation. Consumers \love variety" in that they want to consume
a bundle of dierentiated products rather than buying only one product, i.e., products are less
23 This paper considers rms as political actors with dierent economic capability. For instance, some rms
are successful in pushing their governments to be active in eliminating trade barriers abroad, while others fail to
initiate an anti-dumping investigation against their foreign competitors. Likewise, some rms are better at convincing
legislatures to introduce a trade bill on their behalf, whereas others fail to obtain subsidies in the form of tax-cuts
or cheap input costs.
24 This paper focuses on a partial equilibrium with one industry for the ease of exposition. One can introduce a
numeraire good to absorb income eect, and conduct an general equilibrium analysis maintaining the main results.
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where , pi and qi denote size of economy, price and quantity of a product i, respectively. Maxi-
mizing equation (1) subject to the standard budget constraint E, we obtain the following inverse
demand function for product i.
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We suppose that there are two states s 2 fD;Fg (domestic and foreign), and four rms: i 2
f1;2;3;4g, where product i is associated with rm i.25 Firms 1 and 2 are domestic rms and rms
3 and 4 are foreign rms with dierent marginal cost of production ci (productivity). Variables
that correspond to the foreign market will have an asterisk. I assume that the rms with lower
index value (1,3) in each market have lower marginal cost of production: c1 < c2, c3 < c4. That is,
rms 2 and 4 are not considered to productive. I further assume that only productive rms 1 and 3
can export to the other market.26 Countries are symmetric in that consumers in each market face
the same utility function when consuming product i in a given industry.27 Firm i maximizes its
prot i by choosing the quantity in each market as given in equation (4). We can then solve the
maximization problem to derive the equilibrium quantity and corresponding prices of each good.
Appendix 6.1 contains the results.
1 = (p1   c1)q1 + (p
1   c1   )q
1
2 = (p2   c2)q2
3 = (p3   c3   )q3 + (p
3   c3)q
3
4 = (p
4   c4)q
4 (4)
Note that rm 1 and rm 3 face the same tari  in their respective exporting market. This reects
our assumption of reciprocity in trade negotiations. Although this assumption is made for analytic
25 Considering a more general model with multiple countries and rms is beyond the scope of this paper.
26 There exist ample theoretical and empirical justication for this assumption (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Bernard and
Jensen, 2004; Bernard et al., 2005).
27 One can relax this assumption by explicitly modeling a bargaining step between asymmetric countries. This is
beyond the scope of this paper, and I leave it for future research.
15tractability, it is worth noting that the reciprocal reduction of tari barriers introduces stronger
demand for protection by domestic producers as well. In fact, the results below show that high
taris are optimal only under some conditions even with the norm of reciprocity. Furthermore,
in order to reect the reality that actual tari levels between nations are not exactly the same, I
introduce an asymmetry between country D and F by allowing them to have dierent choke prices
s 2 fD;Fg (the lowest price at which the quantity demanded of a good is equal to zero) in
their respective demand function. To ensure a positive demand, we make a technical assumption
that D and F are suciently high. In particular, we assume the following.
Assumption 1 (Positive Demand)
D + F > c1 + c3 + 2; D + F > c2 + c4   2;
I rst show that increased product dierentiation implies a high degree of intra-industry trade.
This will lay an important theoretical foundation for understanding the gains of trade independent
of comparative advantage or technological dierence on which existing political economy models
are based. Specically, it will shed light on who the potential winners and losers from trade are.
Intra-industry trade is dened in terms of the quantity of goods that productive rms export to
each market, i.e., foreign rm's export to the domestic market (q3) + domestic rm's export to the
foreign market (q
1).
Definition 1 (Intra-industry trade)
IIT() := q3 + q
1 (5)
Proposition 1 (Intra-industry trade) Suppose products are suciently dierentiated such
that 0   < 1
2. Then, intra-industry trade increases as the degree of product dierentiation
increases.
@IIT
@

 

< 1
2
< 0 (6)
Proof is in Appendix 6.2.28
The proposition shows that consumers' love of variety results in a high degree of intra-industry
trade.29 It also highlights the fact that prot maximizing rms will see a big opportunity abroad.
That is, it is not only consumers who love variety, but also productive exporting rms who will gain
28 A more general result can be achieved with a stronger assumption. It can be shown that
@IIT
@ < 0 for all
0 <  < 1 if f3(c + F)   (2c1 + c2 + 2c3 + c4)g=2 <  < (c2   c1 + c4   c3)=4 and D + F > c2 + c4   2.
29 Note that the new-trade theory and new-new trade theory emphasize this mechanism through Dixit-Stiglitz
CES utility function (Krugman, 1980).
16greatly from trade liberalization, particularly when products in an industry are not substitutable
with each other. In this respect, I argue that the incentives of exporting rms to lobby can be
stronger than those of their import-competing counterparts when products are suciently dier-
entiated. Although any rm will benet by having protection at home and open markets abroad,
highly productive exporting rms nd the latter more attractive due to increasing returns-to-scale.
Subsequently, governments, who cannot credibly commit to introducing protective measures when
consumers value variety, reduces trade barriers in return. In the following section, I examine the
political interaction between rms and government.
3.3 Lobbying by Exporters and Trade Liberalization
How can we understand the strategic interaction between rms and governments when rms within
the same industry see the benets from liberalization dierently? What if foreign rms can also
lobby domestic government? Existing political economy models of trade policy have left these
questions unanswered.30
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), I consider the following two stage game. In the
rst stage, rms simultaneously choose their political contribution schedules, and in the second,
government sets policy  and collects contribution Li() from each rm in the second stage. I
consider the lobbying game in the domestic market (i 2 f1;2;3g) since similar results will follow
in foreign market due to symmetry.
The government values social welfare. Specically, it tries to increase consumer surplus dened
in equation (7) and tari revenue. I assume that the government distributes tari revenue equally
to its population. The revenue is dened as r() = q3.
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The government maximizes the following objective function. Note that a is a weight that the
government assigns to welfare relative to political rents.
max

X
i
Li() + aW() (8)
30 Grossman and Helpman (1994) assume that pre-tari world prices are xed exogenously. Consequently, foreign
rms do not have any incentives to lobby because domestic tari rate will not aect their prots. As Section 4 shows,
foreign rms do lobby.
17where W() = 1() + 2() + s() + r()
The government faces the following trade-o depending on the level of product dierentiation.
When products are highly substitutable, increasing a tari protects domestic rms from foreign
competition. The demand for protection will be particularly strong if foreign rm 3 is highly
productive and charge a much lower price than domestic rms 1 and 2. When consumers value
variety, on the other hand, introducing protective measures will decrease consumer surplus. It is
important to note that domestic rms will not suer from foreign competition as much as they
would under high substitutability across goods within industry. In fact, productive domestic rm
1 will see a big opportunity from the foreign market since foreign consumers love variety as well. I
characterize the optimal tari of the game with product dierentiation.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Tariff) Suppose rms use lobbying schedules that are dierentiable
around equilibrium tari rate o. Then, government optimally chooses tari o that satises,
o =
3 + 2 +  + 
10a3 + (10 + 21a)2 + (16   20a) + 16   20a
(9)
where
 = 4a(c1 + 2c2   2c3   D)
 = 2(c2   c3 + D)   (2 + 7a)c1   a(c2 + 15c3   2c4   15D + 2F)
 = 4[2c2 + c4 + a( 2c1 + 6c3 + c4   3D)   2D   F]
 =  8(1 + a)c1 + 4( 2 + 5a)c3   4( 2 + a)D + 8(1 + a)F
Proof in Appendix 6.3
The Proposition shows the optimal tari can be expressed as a ratio of two third-order poly-
nomial functions of the level of product dierentiation. Although the equation is hard to interpret
on its own, an oligopoly game with a nite number of rms has a benet of giving a closed-form
solution as a result of political interaction between rms and the government. Evaluating the
equation at  = 0 helps understand the intuition.31 With suciently large a (the government
values social welfare more than political rents), it is optimal to set a negative tari. In other words,
import-subsidy should be optimal when products are not substitutable with each other.32
This result suggests that strong political pressures to open trade would exist when products
are dierentiated: open-trade-for-sale rather than protection-for-sale occurs. Figure 7 graphically
31 The optimal tari schedule is continuous at  = 0.
32 Note that import-subsidy might be politically unlikely in reality. However, this theoretical result highlights the
importance of high product dierentiation behind liberalization.
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Figure 7: Domestic Firm's productivity and optimal tari: This gure presents a simulation
result from Proposition 2 to show that liberal trade policy is optimal when products are suciently
dierentiated. Each line corresponds to the optimal tari evaluated at four dierent values of
c1 2 f0:1;0:15;0:3;0:5g, where domestic rm 1's productivity increases (lower marginal cost of
production) as we move downwards. Note that rm 1 is a domestic rm with productive type.
The simulation result also suggests that it is optimal for the government to give import subsidy,
and the parameter space corresponding to import-subsidy expands as the productivity of rm 1
increases.
presents the result from Proposition 2 simulating over dierent values of rm 1's productivity and
the level of product dierentiation.33 Three general patterns are worth noting in this political game.
First, it is optimal to set lower trade barriers when products are suciently dierentiated. Second,
the government should impose only small taris (if any) when products are highly dierentiated.
Furthermore, the range of parameter values of  that requires negative tari, i.e., import subsidy,
increases as the productivity of domestic rm 1 increases. Finally, it is interesting to note that
non-monotonicity exists when domestic rm 1 is highly productive. The inverse U-shape of the
optimal tari schedule suggests that the government may also want to liberalize when products are
highly substitutable and its domestic rm is very productive. The intuition behind this result is
that highly productive domestic rms can compete with foreign rms by setting much lower prices
and take a larger market share due to the substitutability of goods.
To summarize, lobbying by productive exporters can shift trade policies toward more open
33 For this simulation I hold other parameters constant at a set of parameter values that ts Assumption 1 on the
relative productivity and market size: c2 = 0:65, c3 = 0:1, c4 = 0:65, D = 5, F = 2, and a = 6:5. We evaluate 
o
at four distinct values of c1: 0.1, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5 so that it is less than c2. With suciently large a, similar patterns
exist even after setting the parameters at other values.
19trade. The argument, in brief, presupposes the well known rm-level productivity dierences:
some rms are productive enough to export to foreign markets while other less productive rms
face foreign competition in their own market. The preferences of each type of rm conicts with
each other since exporters have preferences for a free and fair market access abroad, while import-
competing rms want their government to introduce more protective measures.34 However, their
political power and incentives to lobby may not be equal. Ample empirical evidence shows that
resource reallocation occurs toward more productive exporting rms (Bernard et al., 2007a; Eaton
et al., 2011). This implies that exporters have more economic resources to spend on lobbying than
import-competitors. On the other hand, the lives of import-competitors are less threatened with
high product dierentiation. As such, product dierentiation increases exporting rms' incentive
to lobby while it reduces that of import-competing rms.
4 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the main empirical results that establish the eects of product dierentiation
on rm-level lobbying and product-level taris. My theory predicts that productive exporting
rms lobby more when they produce dierentiated products. Moreover, the results from Section 3
sugggest that high product dierentiation is associated with high intra-industry trade and lower
tari rates. Section 4.1 describes the data used for the analysis. Section 4.2 examines the conditions
under which productive exporting rms are more likely to lobby on trade policy. Section 4.3 shows
that a higher degree of intra-industry trade is associated with trade liberalization, which implies
political cleavages within industry. Section 4.4 analyzes the substantive contents of lobbying by
analyzing the texts of trade bills introduced since 1999. Finally, Section 4.5 examines whether
products with a high degree of dierentiation have lower taris.
4.1 Data
This paper makes an important empirical contribution by constructing an original dataset. First,
I construct a rm-level lobbying dataset based on 838,588 lobbying reports that became available
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995. Although a number of studies have used the
same data (e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 2002; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2009; Ludema et al., 2010),
only a small part of the original data|in terms of its contents and time frame|has been analyzed
34 Recall that I assume that the norm of reciprocity governs international trade negotiations (Bagwell and Staiger,
1999). That is, domestic exporting rms lobby their government for trade liberalization, which puts indirect pressure
on foreign governments to eliminate their trade barriers.
20due to the large scale and unstructured format of the raw data.35 More importantly, because there
is no unique identier for rms (other than their names) in lobbying reports, it has been dicult to
link rm level political activity with their economic characteristics. This has constrained the use
of the data to study the link between lobbying and trade policy outcomes. My data combines the
entire lobbying data, scraped with a text-parsing program, with rm level nancial data as well as
detailed information on legislative bills they have targeted for lobbying. To do so, I manually match
each rm who lobbied at least once on trade issues with the rms in multiple nance databases
such as Orbis to establish the link between political and economic variables.36
The lobbying dataset identies rm-level political activity and actual lobbying expenditures
directly related to trade policy making. To date, empirical studies of political economy models
of trade have primarily used the PAC (Political Action Committee) level Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) campaign contribution dataset (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Bombardini, 2008). Although campaign contribution certainly reect gen-
eral preferences of industry as a whole, this approach relies on a strong assumption that political
interests across rms within the industry are more or less homogeneous. Second, the literature
relies on an arbitrary assumption about what constitutes a contribution. Given that all sectors
make some contributions, the common practice of classifying some sectors as \organized" while
others as not based simply on an arbitrary contribution-amount cut-o seems problematic (e.g.,
Goldberg and Maggi, 1999).
Finally, campaign contributions might conate highly complex preferences of member rms
within each PAC such as that over electoral outcomes, domestic social-political issues, and various
economic policies that are distinct from trade policies. In contrast, the lobbying dataset captures
each individual rm's direct, expressed interest in a particular trade policy. Specically, one can
identify rms who lobby on particular trade and tari bills thanks to Section 5(b)(2)(A) of the
Lobbying Disclosure Action of 1995 that requires each report to contain \a list of bill numbers" that
are targeted to be lobbied.37 To be sure, this is not to argue that campaign contributions do not
35 It is not clear how the dataset is constructed for these studies. I parse the original xml les available from the
Senate Oce of Public Records (SOPR). This allows me to construct a more detailed and accurate dataset than the
one available at the Center for Responsive Politics. Parsing each lobbying report with a personal computer not only
takes enormous time, but also is unviable due to memory limits. I used high performance cluster machines at the
TIGRESS High Performance Computing Center at Princeton University to parallelize the parsing program. As of
now, the entire dataset can be constructed within ve hours. The code and data will be disseminated publicly with
the nancial support from NSF Grant SES-1264090. An example of a lobbying report can be found in Appendix 6.7
36 Orbis contains more than 99 million global rms including very small private rms. This allows me to match
all rms in lobbying report.
37 Firms are not required to report whether they support or oppose a given bill. I partially overcome this problem
21Dataset Original source Variables N
Lobbying
LDA dataset lobbying expenditures; issues; related bills;
838,588 (Senate's Oce of contacted government agencies; lobbyists;
Public Records) primary place of business; aliated organizations
Financial
COMPUSTAT audited nancial and geographical sales data 46,241
Osiris (Bureau van Dijk) audited nancial data on European private rms over 65,000
Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) limited nancial data on U.S. private rms over 99 million
Trade
WITS HS8 ad-valorem tari (UNCTAD Method 1) 219,971
Feenstra, Schott product level volume of trade (import/export) 153,666
U.S. Census Bureau related party trade at 6 digits naics industry 509,971
TTBD (Chad Bown) antidumping, countervaling duties 1,813
Bills Library of Congress (Thomas) committees, related bills, CRS summary, sponsors 90,124
Industry
Broda & Weinstein product dierentiation, elasticity of substitution 8,213
Bartelsman & Gray annual industry-level (naics) data 22,704
Table 2: Final database: The nal database is a panel of annual rm-level lobbying data combined
with rms' nancial characteristics and trade policies.
matter at all. In fact, campaign contributions can serve as both substitutes and complements to
lobbying. Rather, I argue that existing studies have omitted an important political channel whereby
prot-maximizing private corporations utilize lobbying in order to buy \access" to legislators to
aect specic policies and bills, rather than to make campaign contributions to inuence electoral
outcomes.38 This justies the use of LDA dataset in studying heterogeneous political behavior of
rms that are relevant for aecting trade policy.
I consider trade ows and trade policies at highly rened levels of product categorization. I
consider the U.S. taris at the 8-digits Harmonized System (HS), which is the actual legal tari
line of the U.S. The degree of intra-industry trade has been calculated at HS6, which is the most
rened level possible for the measure given the distinct product categories that the U.S. uses for
exported goods (Schedule B) and imported goods (HTS). I also use the Temporary Trade Barriers
Database (TTBD) to address the concern that countries increasingly use non-tari barriers instead
of (or in addition to) traditional tari barriers. All HS8 products which have been subject to at
least one anti-dumping case and countervailing duties are included in the analysis.
To verify whether the content of lobbying is consistent with the theoretical predictions, I parse
by analyze the contents of bills in Section 4.4
38 Drutman and Hopkins (2013) analyze more than 250,000 internal emails from Enron, and show that the company
devoted \minimal attention to campaigns, elections, or fund-raising." Instead, the rm's political attention is more
on participating in rule-making. The nding provides convincing reasons why LDA data is particularly useful in
studying rm-level political activities. Note that, Ansolabehere et al. (2002) show that ideologically oriented groups
such as labor unions, on the other hand, are more likely to utilize PAC contributions.
22all legislative bills introduced since 1999 (from 106th Congress: both the Senate and the House of
Representatives). In particular, I focus on Congressional Research Service (CRS) bill summaries to
examine whether rms lobby on dierentiated products. I identify all lobbied bills using automated
text matches either by bill title or bill number appearing in lobbying reports.
Finally, given that there exist limitations in identifying actual products that each rm produces,
I added the most rened industry level variables|NAICS (North American Industry Classication
System) 6-digits| into the analysis.39 This allows me to control for industry level characteristics
such as total employment, payment, value added, energy consumption, etc, which have been iden-
tied as important determinants of trade policy-making. Table 2 describes the original sources of
data used in this paper.40
4.2 Product Dierentiation and Firm-level Lobbying
This section tests the hypothesis that exporters lobby more on trade policy, while import-competing
rms lobby less when they produce dierentiated products. The highly detailed data on rm-level
lobbying activity oers an unique means to analyze which rms lobby under what condition. I nd
that rm-level productivity is an important determinant of lobbying on trade policy.
I use productivity, measured as value-added per labor, as a proxy measure for rm's interest
in exporting markets.41 My focus on productivity is justied on both theoretical and empirical
ground. Theoretically, productivity dierence has been an important building block for the new-
new trade theory inducing heterogeneous economic interest of rms. The model in Section 3
also suggests that productivity dierences across rms is important in understanding strategic
interacting between rms and governments. Furthermore, there exists ample empirical evidence
that productivity dierence is critical in determining rm's ability to export.42 Finally, rms with
higher productivity will have stronger interests in foreign market access because of the increasing
returns-to-scale. That is, larger prots will be expected by having access to a bigger market, and
39 Product level imports/exports data at the rm level is condential. I am currently in the process of applying
for getting an access to a number of condential datasets such as LFTTD and LBD from the U.S. Census Bureau.
40The entire database is interconnected by SQL (Structured Query Language), and will be available publicly.
41 Productivity is measured as value-added (total sales less cost of goods sold) per labor. A more rigorous
productivity estimation technique is explained in detail in Appendix 6.5 for interested readers.
42 Each rm trading in the U.S. stock market les FORM 10-K pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In this form, rms report their geographic sales data. I calculated the U.S. sales share based
on the most recent data stored in Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) UNIX secure server. The segment
history database is separated into multiple sub-datasets. In order to identify actual geographic sales share, one needs
to carefully merge SEG-ANNFUND and SEG-GEO datasets in Compustat. Unfortunately, not every rm reports
their geographic sales data, and I found that many multinational rms with foreign presence actually reports that
100% of their sales is from the U.S. I thank Alexis Furuichi and Todd M. Hines for bringing this dataset into my
attention.
23this becomes more attractive when rm's marginal cost of production is small, i.e., productive.
For my empirical analysis, I consider all publicly trading rms in the U.S. stock market since
1999{ a total of 34,048 observations.43 I manually match each of these rms with the names of
clients who lobbied at least once on either trade or tari issues based on all lobbying reports led
since 1999. In the LDA dataset, a client is dened as \Any person or entity that employs or
retains another person for nancial or other compensation to conduct lobbying activities on behalf
of the person or entity. An organization employing its own lobbyists is considered its own client
for reporting purposes." Out of 4,089 rms from 235 dierent industries (SIC 4 digits level), there
are 588 rms who have lobbied at least once on trade/tari issues.44
Figure 8 shows that rms are more likely to lobby when they are more productive. It also cap-
tures an important variation in rm level lobbying depending on the level of dierentiation in the
industry in which each rm competes. Specically, it shows that when products are highly dieren-
tiated (rst column), productive rms dominate lobbying. This provides a political explanation for
lower tari for dierentiated products. In contrast, rms with dierent levels of productivity lobby
at the same rate when they produce substitutable goods. This is consistent with the theory that
less productive rms have higher incentives to lobby for protection to prevent them from exiting
the market.
To further examine this, I t a logistic regression of lobbying on rm level characteristics such as
employment, sales, and capital expenditure. Domestic producer is a binary variable that is unity
when the rm provides goods only domestically. This variable controls for the incentive of import-
competing rms. I use three dierent measures for product dierentiation. Differentiated and
Homogeneous is the binary measure for product dierentiation that is the primary measure used for
the empirical analysis. The original continuous measure for product dierentiation () is estimated
by Broda and Weinstein (2006), where smaller value implies larger dierentiation. As a robustness
check, I also use the Rauch product dierentiation index. Rauch (1999) categorizes goods traded on
organized exchanges as homogeneous (W), and other goods as dierentiated (N).45 Note that the
43 Only publicly traded rms are considered because it gives a well-dened population of rms. Otherwise, it is
impossible to dene a population of all rms as the boundary of rms become increasingly arbitrary with private
rms. Moreover, private rms in the U.S. are not legally required to report their nancial information, which will
further limit the ability to estimate productivity. Despite this restriction, enough variation exists among public rms
in terms of their economic and political activities. The time frame was chosen because the LDA dataset is available
from 1999.
44 I analyze the contents of their lobbying based on the specic legislative bills that have been indicated as being
lobbied. Section 5(b)(2)(A) of the Lobbying Disclosure Action of 1995 requires that each report shall contain \a list
of bill numbers."
45 For instance, price per pound of homogeneous chemical products such as Polyoxyethylene Sorbitan Monostearate
is quoted weekly in Chemical Marketing Reporter. W, and N is the original index developed by Rauch, where R is
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Figure 8: Lobbying and Product Dierentiation: This gure shows that rms are more likely
to lobby when they are more productive (darker shade means a higher proportion of rms lobbying).
It also shows that when products are highly dierentiated (rst column), productive rms dominate
lobbying. Contrarily, when products are substitutable (last column) a larger proportion of rms
with dierent levels of productivity lobby suggesting higher level of political competition. As
expected, productive rms are more likely to lobby either when goods are highly dierentiated or
highly substitutable. This corroborates the result from Proposition 2, and suggest that U.S. rms
are in general highly productive as seen from Figure 7. Productivity is measured as value-added
per labor. Each number inside of each cell represents the total number of rms belonging to each
category.
productivity measure is time invariant and varies across NAICS6 industries that each rm mainly
competes. Thus, this measure also controls for industry level unobservable heterogeneity.
Table 3 summarizes the result. It shows that productive rms are more likely to lobby when
their products are dierentiated within industry. This result holds consistently across dierent
measures of product dierentiation.
Finally, I examine the predicted probability of lobbying simulating over dierent levels of pro-
ductivity observed in the data holding other variables at their mean (scalar variables) and median
values (categorical variables). Panel (a) of Figure 9 shows that productive rms are more likely to
lobby on trade issues only when they compete in an industry with highly dierentiated products.
This is starkly dierent from the rm level lobbying behavior in homogeneous industries, where the
lobbying activity of rm is unrelated to the productivity of those rms. By taking the dierence
between the two predicted probabilities, it becomes clear that less productive rms are less likely
used as a baseline category in the analysis. See Rauch (1999) for details.
25Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Productivity  Dierentiated 0:51 0:51
(0:09) (0:09)
Productivity  dierentiation ()  0:02
(0:00)
Productivity  Rauch N 0:09 0:09
(0:04) (0:04)
Productivity 0:01 0:01 0:41 0:06 0:06
(0:09) (0:09) (0:10) (0:10) (0:10)
No-geo-sales-data  0:02  0:03  0:04  0:02  0:03
(0:14) (0:14) (0:14) (0:14) (0:14)
Domestic producer  0:06  0:05  0:09  0:14  0:13
(0:12) (0:12) (0:12) (0:13) (0:13)
Employment 0:33 0:31 0:25 0:30 0:28
(0:10) (0:11) (0:11) (0:11) (0:11)
Property, plant and equipment 0:38 0:36 0:38 0:36 0:33
(0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
Capital Expenditure  0:14  0:13  0:12  0:13  0:12
(0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
Sales/turnover 0:56 0:54 0:48 0:58 0:57
(0:20) (0:20) (0:20) (0:20) (0:20)
market-value 0:14 0:15 0:14 0:15 0:16
(0:04) (0:04) (0:04) (0:04) (0:04)
Cost of goods sold  0:08  0:06 0:02  0:09  0:06
(0:13) (0:13) (0:13) (0:13) (0:13)
Dierentiated 0:79 0:79
(0:24) (0:24)
Homogeneous  0:13  0:13
(0:08) (0:08)
dierentiation ()  0:05
(0:01)
Productivity  Rauch W  0:26  0:26
(0:09) (0:09)
Year Fixed Eects No Yes Yes No Yes
Log Likelihood  3302:87  3295:17  3311:08  3211:82  3204:07
Num. obs. 22454 22454 22454 21826 21826
***p < 0:001, **p < 0:01, *p < 0:05, p < 0:1
Table 3: Interaction between Product Dierentiation and Firm-level Productivity: Pro-
ductive rms are more likely to lobby when products are dierentiated. This result is robust to
having dierent measures for product dierentiation. For example the negative coecient of the
interaction term between productivity and  is expected because lower value of  means higher
product dierentiation.
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Figure 9: Productive Firms are More Likely to Lobby when Products are Dierentiated:
Panel (a) shows that productive rms are more likely to lobby on trade issues when they compete
in an industry with highly dierentiated products. This is starkly dierent from the rm-level
lobbying behavior in homogeneous industries, where productivity of rms does not explain their
lobbying activities. Panel (b) presents the dierence, dierentiated industry less homogeneous
industry, in the probability of lobbying. Note that the dierence is negative when productivity of
rms are low. Although the eect is relatively small, its statistical signicance suggests that less
productive rms are more likely to lobby when they produce substitutable goods.
to lobby when they produce dierentiated products. This is consistent with the theoretical predic-
tion that product dierentiation explains both active lobbying by productive rms and absence of
lobbying by less productive rms. Unlike earlier studies, my nding identies which rm lobbies
and when they actively do so (c.f., Milner, 1988b). That is, productive rms lobby when they
produce dierentiated products.
4.3 Intra-industry Trade and Trade Liberalization
My theory also predicts that high intra-industry trade is associated with liberal trade policy. This is
because of consumers' love of variety as well as governments' ability to credibly commit to liberal
trade policy as shown in Section 3. This section nds that the variation in trade policy across
similar products within industry can be explained by high intra-industry trade.
I use the Grubel{Lloyd measure of intra-industry trade for a product i at time t.46 I then t
the generalized mixed-eect model given in equation (10) in order to identify time-varying eects
of intra-industry trade on trade liberalization. I follow the common practice of weighting taris by
46 I use this conventional measure rather than the modied Grubel{Lloyd index introduced earlier in Section 2.3
because I explicitly control for the import value in the statistical analysis.
27the total value of imports as in Treer (1993). The unit of analysis is HS6 manufacturing product
i|NAICS6 industry j|year t. HS6 categorization is chosen because it is the most rened level of
product categorization at which import and export codes agree with each other.47 Product level
controls include total value of imports, number of countries that the U.S. exports and imports
the given product. Several industry level (NAICS6) covariates for industry j such as employment,
value-added, total-factor-productivity, payroll, and energy consumption are also included using the
information from Bartelsman et al. (2000). This results in a dataset with a multilevel structure
whereby each product belongs to an industry. A mixed-eect model is particularly useful to
incorporate the variation at the dierent levels of hierarchy, i.e., HS6 and NAICS (Gelman and Hill,
2007). Finally, varying intercepts for each level is included in order to control for the heterogeneity
in each product and time.
ijt j i;t
indep:
 N(i + t + IITitt + Zit + Xjt;s2
y); (10)
i
i:i:d:  N(;s2
); t
i:i:d:  N(;s2
); t
i:i:d:  N(;s2
);
 = (1 2 3)>;  = (1 2 3 4 5)>;
Zit =

imp:valueit n:exp:ctyit n:imp:ctyit

;
Xjt =

empjt vaddjt tfpjt payjt engjt

;
Figure 10 summarizes the results from two separate models. First, in order to account for
the large number of products with zero tari rate (ijt = 0), I estimated a generalized mixed-
eect model with binary dependent variable indicating zero tari rate. Note that there are 17,419
observations at the HS6 category that have zero tari out of 127,972 from 1999 to 2005.48Panel (a)
shows a simulation result based on quasi-Bayesian method after tting the model above. It shows
that hypothetically increasing the degree of intra-industry trade from the lowest to the highest has
a positive eect on complete elimination of tari barriers. The eect is statistically signicant and
steadily increases from late 1990s.49
I t the second-stage time-varying coecient model conditional on positive tari rates (ijt > 0).
I then multiply the estimated coecients for each year by the probability of having positive taris
47 As noted, the U.S. has two separate coding system for documenting exporting (Schedule B) and importing (HTS)
goods. They agree only up to 6 digits. That is, same 8 digits code at Schedule B and HTS does not necessarily refer
to identical products. Therefore, the aggregation at the 6 digits level by taking an average appropriately weighted
by respective volume of trade is necessary.
48 I included total value of imports and the number of countries that the U.S. export for each product in order to
account for the fact that the U.S. does not produce some of the products at all.
49The tari data for year 1994 is not available in WITS and thus omitted.
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(b) Conditional on Positive Taris
Figure 10: Eects of Intra-industry Trade on Trade Liberalization: Panel (a) shows the
eect of changing the level of intra-industry trade from the lowest (Grubel{Lloyd index = 0) to the
highest (Grubel{Lloyd index = 1) on the likelihood of the product's ad-valorem tari becoming
zero. It shows that increasing the degree of intra-industry trade makes it more likely to remove
tari-barriers on each product from late 1990s. The eect is estimated by generalized linear mixed
eect model with time varying eect of intra-industry trade. Panel (b) shows that increase in
the degree of intra-industry trade, measured by Grubel{Lloyd index, is negatively correlated with
the average ad-valorem tari rate. Note that such eect has disappeared in recent years. This is
because taris on more than 1/3 of products have been eliminated with little variation in applied
tari rates. Average ad-valorem tari rate is calculated at the HS6 product level weighted by HS8
digits total values of import. For panel (a), quasi-Bayesian method is applied to the tted model
to simulate the hypothetical change from complete zero intra-industry trade to highest level of
intra-industry trade.
in order to get the estimated eect of IIT on trade liberalization: i.e., E(ijtjTit;Zit;Xjt) = E(ijt j
Tit;Zit;Xjt;ijt > 0)  P(ijt > 0 j Tit;Zit;Xit). As Panel (b) shows, a one-unit increase in the
intra-industry trade index is associated with about a 0.2 percentage point decrease in average
tari rate. Note that the eect is statistically indistinguishable from zero in recent years. This is
because a large number of products already have reached their zero-tari level as Panel (a) shows.
In sum, Figure 10 shows that a high degree of intra-industry trade is correlated highly with trade
liberalization.
4.4 Text Analysis of Trade Bills
So far, I have shown that productive rms are more likely to lobby when they produce dierentiated
products and that high intra-industry trade is associated with liberal trade policy. However, we
still do not know what exactly rms are looking for when they lobby. In fact, this is highly dicult
29to identify relying solely on lobbying reports. I overcome this problem by establishing direct links
between legislative bills and lobbying reports. Specically, I consider the universe of trade and
tari related bills introduced since 1999 (106th Congress), and search through all lobbying reports
one-by-one to determine which bill is lobbied. This section provides evidence of product specic
lobbying by rms in favor of reducing trade barriers.
Identifying the universe of trade and tari bills is not possible given that any bill can be
deemed as related to trade: bills on immigration, environment, labor standard, or even defense
can be \trade-related" depending on the perspectives of researcher. Searching based on single
words also introduces problems given that a word such as \trade" can be used in multiple dier-
ent contexts, e.g., \trade stocks in nance". In order to address the rst problem, I utilize the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) summary of each bill. CRS aims to provide nonpartisan
analysis of various policy issues both for the United States Congress and the public. In partic-
ular, it oers a detailed summary of all congressional bills. The summary is useful to identify
the overarching issue areas related to a given bill with less political/contextual noise on topics
than full texts of bills. Second, for all CRS summaries, I employ a tokenized words search in
order to identify bills that are directly related to trade policy. I consider bills that include at
least one of the following tokenized terms : trade barrier(s); tariff barrier(s); non-tariff
barriers(s); tariff reduction; export subsidy; the U.S. trade representative; world
trade organization; most favored nation; rules of origin; generalized system of
preferences; free trade agreement; uruguay round. This results in a total of 685 bills.50 Ta-
ble 4 presents 10 randomly selected bills.51 Given the list of trade bills, we can search the universe
of 838,588 lobbying reports to check if there exists any lobbying activities associated with each bill.
Which bills are lobbied? Are lobbied bills systemically dierent from non-lobbied bills in terms of
their context? If so, how can we identify the pattern? By answering these questions, I examine
whether the contents of lobbied bills are consistent with the theoretical predictions from Section 3.
Using full texts of each bill is problematic because actual texts of bills are endogenous to
50 Adding other terms such as foreign trade usually introduce bills that have already been identied through
the other terms, but it adds a large number of non-trade related bills due to the broad context of foreign trade.
Including, harmonized tariff schedule signicantly increases the size of the trade bills to 7,316. This is mostly
from product-specic miscellaneous taris bills. However, the current parsing algorithm is not complete to search
all of these in lobbying reports. A good example can be seen from Fig 14 which shows that the lobbying status of
a large number of miscellaneous bills can not be identied if they are reported in a format such as \H.R.4182-4186.
The algorithm is currently being improved to accommodate H.R.4183, H.R.4184, H.R.4185 in addition to the two
bills that can be searched through regular expressions. Thus, I analyze miscellaneous taris bills separately below.
51The full list of bills will be available through a web-appendix.
30Cong. Bill Ocial Title
106 S111 NAFTA Accession Act
106 S101 United States Agricultural Trade Act of 1999
108 HRES712
Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4759) to
implement the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement.
112 S3568 Citrus, Wool, and Cotton Trust Fund Act of 2012
112 HR6539 United States-Brazil Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade Act
106 HR4885 Rural America Prosperity Act of 2000
112 HR6699 Liqueed Natural Gas for NATO Act
109 S2027 United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
107 S944 United States-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement Act of 2001
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding
106 SRES226 Japanese participation in the World Trade Organization.
. . .
. . .
. . .
Table 4: Trade Bills: This table lists10 randomly selected trade bills identied by the tokenized
word searching algorithm. It demonstrates that the bills are indeed trade related. The full list of
bills will be available through a web-appendix.
political process: lobbyists often help draft bills or even write them; legislators insert certain
texts to satisfy their constituencies. To remedy this problem, I utilize CRS summary. As noted,
CRS oers highly detailed description of each bill from a nonpartisan perspective. Also, it is an
independent organization that is outside of lobbying process, which allows researchers to establish
a link between the contexts of a given bill to its propensity to be lobbied. Although the text of
summary is inevitably aected by the contents of original bill, this is the best available source for
deception of each bill created by bipartisan organization.
I rst create the list of p words w used in trade related bills.52 I then count wij, the number
of times each word j 2 f1;:::;pg appears in each bill i: wi = (wi1;:::;wip).53 This will create
a bill-to-term matrix (number of trade-related bills p) summarizing the distribution of words
over trade bills. However, estimating the eect of individual words on lobbying is computationally
dicult due to the large dimensionality of p, the number of unique words. To address this problem,
I use a variable selection method LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) to
select the list of words that are particularly useful in explaining whether bill i is lobbied or not
(yi), while constraining other coecients to be zero (Tibshirani, 1996; Friedman et al., 2010). As
described in equation (11), this can be achieved by putting the constraint on the sum of coecients
j associated with each word. I use the logistic link to do a LASSO regressing of binary indicator
52 For the analysis below, I used words appearing at least 10 bills after stemming them and removing stop words.
This results in p = 1659.
53 Note that most of the entries of wi will be zero. For the purpose of prediction, I use frequency since the size of
document itself is useful in predicting the occurrence of lobbying. I use proportion of words later in topic modeling.
31for lobbying on the list of words.
min
0;2Rp+1
2
4(yi   0   wT
i )2 + 
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j=1
j j j
3
5 (11)
I use cross-validation to choose  that minimizes out-of-sample prediction error. Specically, I
do 20-fold cross-validation whereby  is chosen to minimize the mean-squared error (MSE) in
predicting the occurrence of lobbying. The model is then applied to 5% of randomly chosen bills
to predict how likely each bill is going to be lobbied.54 This process is continued 1000 times to
examine whether there exist words in CRS summary that helps predict lobbying. On average, bills
that are not lobbied are predicted to be lobbied 35%, whereas bills that are actually lobbied are
predicted to be so in almost 80% of the time. The result is graphically presented in Figure 17
in Appendix 6.4.55 Figure 11 presents the top 30 words that are found to increase (decrease) the
predicted probability of lobbying for each bill. The size of each word is proportional to the absolute
size of the coecient j, where bigger size of the word in the rst (second) column implies that a
bill with the word are more (less) likely to be lobbied.
Having identied the words associated with frequent lobbying, I examine in which context they
are actually used. The word \characterist" appears in multiple Reciprocal Market Access Act in
2007, 2009, and 2011. For example, as it is shown in Figure 12, Reciprocal Market Access Act of
2011 requires that foreign governments to reduce or eliminate trade and non-tari barriers with
respect to U.S. exports of any product with same physical characteristics.
Two important points are in order. First, the word \characteristics" is used in describing specic
physical properties of products validating the theoretical connection between product dierentiation
and the incentives of lobbying. This bill was lobbied by Corning Inc. Based on the texts in the
actual lobbying report as seen in Figure 13, we know that Corning Inc. is lobbying for reducing the
trade barriers on optical bers.56 I checked the level of product dierentiation () for this particular
product: Optical fibers, optical fiber bundles and cables (HS8 90011000). The measure
54 I used cross-validated estimates instead of out-of-sample-validated estimates given that my purpose is to identify
the words associated with lobbying in the sample. I used the latter to check whether there is over-tting sample-
specic attributes of the observed data. Doing so also gives statistically signicant separation. I thank Marc Ratkovic
for his insights on applying the method.
55 I did non-parametric statistical test to access the mean dierence of predicted probabilities between lobbied and
non-lobbied bills. Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used because the truncation of probabilities (between zero and one)
makes it hard to make the normality assumption necessary for t-test. The result validates that there is a signicant
mean dierence in cross-validation sample prediction (p-value < 2:2e   16). Wilcoxon signed-rank test is computed
by calculating the following test statistic. W =j
PNr
i=1fsgn(x2;i   x1;i)  Rig j, where Ri denotes the rank order of
absolute dierence between pairs (x2;i x1;i). This test statistic is normally distributed. t-test gives the same result,
where p-value is < 2:2e   16, and 0:232 respectively.
56As of 2013, the MFN tari rate for HS8 90011000 is 6.7%.
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Figure 11: Words with Top 30 Loadings The size of each word is proportional to the size of
loading in the LASSO regression. The bigger the size of a given word in the rst (second) column
implies that a bill with the word will be more (less) likely to be lobbied.
\Reciprocal Market Access Act of 2011 - Prohibits the President from agreeing to the reduction
or elimination of the existing rate of duty on any product in order to carry out a trade agreement
entered into between the United States and a foreign country until the President certies to Congress
that: (1) the United States has obtained the reduction or elimination of tari and nontari barriers
and policies and practices of such foreign country with respect to U.S. exports of any product that
has the same physical characteristics and uses as the product for which the President seeks to
modify its rate of duty, and (2) any violation of the trade agreement is immediately enforceable
by withdrawal of the modication of the existing duty on such foreign product until the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) certies to Congress that the United States has obtained
the reduction or elimination of the tari or nontari barrier or policy or practice of such foreign
government..."
Figure 12: 112th Congress S. 1711: CRS Summary
of  is 1.92 (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Recall that lower value of  implies high dierentiation.
The mean value of  is 11.14 and the minimum value is 1.10 indicating that optical ber is a
highly dierentiated product with dierent wavelength of light and bandwidths. Second, Corning
33\WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the treatment of optical ber; Support for H.R. 1749
/ S. 1711, Reciprocal Market Access Act of 2011; Treatment of optical ber in foreign markets;
Reform of Section 337 of Trade Act of 1974; Chinese Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement"
Figure 13: Lobbying Report by Corning Inc. (2012 Fourth Quarter)
Inc. lobbied in support of reducing trade barriers on the product both at home and abroad
(reciprocally). This corroborates the theoretical prediction that domestic rms might nd lobbying
for reducing trade barriers at home optimal since reciprocal treatments of the same product abroad
will signicantly increase their prots due to increasing returns to scale.
Another word that is associated with frequent lobbying is \extends." This term is used for
extending early legislation that promotes trade: e.g., \Trade Act of 2002" (HR3009), \AGOA
Acceleration Act of 2004" (S2529), \To extend the Generalized System of Preferences and the
Andean Trade Preference Act, and for other purposes" (HR4284). It is also widely used for
extending temporary duty-free measures applied to specic products (usually until the end of each
Congress). As an example, the top panel of Figure 14 presents a part of Trade Act of 2002 where
\extends" is used. Mattel Inc., a company producing dierentiated brands of toys such as Barbie
dolls and Fisher-Price, lobbied on this bill.57 Note that lobbying reports are useful not only for
determining any occurrence of lobbying but also for identifying rms' direct interests with respect
to product specic trade policy. All other lobbied bills lobbied by Mattel Inc. (H.R.4182-4186,
S.2099-2103) are related to suspending duties on highly specic products that directly concern the
rm's interests. Interestingly, the bills were sponsored by Rep. Jane Harman (CA-36) and Sen.
Dianne Feinstein (CA) on behalf of Mattel Inc. headquartered in California.
\Extends, through December 31, 2006, treatment free of any duties, quantitative restrictions,
limitations, or consultation levels to certain apparel articles imported into the United States after
assembly in one or more ATPDEA beneciary countries from U.S. or ATPDEA country products."
\H.R.3009, Trade Act of 2002. Certain miscellaneous tari bills to suspend the rates of duty
on certain toy-related articles (H.R.4182-4186; S.2099-2103). WTO market access negotiations for
non-agricultural products Port and border security measures"
Figure 14: (Top) An example of the use of \extends" from the CRS summary of H.R. 3009.
(Bottom) Lobbying Report by Mattel Inc. (2002 Midyear) who lobbied on the bill.
All of these are examples of Miscellaneous Tari Bills that each Congress passes (except for
107th Congress) to suspend or extend the current suspension of duties on hundreds of products.
57 Note that dolls are arguably dierentiated products:  for Dolls representing only human beings, whether
or not dressed (HS8 90011000) is 2.55.
34Cong. Bill Ocial Title Firms (Location) Sponsor (state)
109 S2325
A bill to reduce temporarily the duty
Bose (MA) John Kerry (MA) on certain audio headphones achieving
full-spectrum noise reduction
111 S2098
A bill to reduce temporarily the duty Louisiana
Je Bingaman (NM) on certain isotopic separation energy
machinery and apparatus services (NM)
112 S2334
A bill to reduce temporarily General Motors (MI)
Carl Levin (MI) the duty on lithium ion Hitachi Automotive Product (MI)
electrical storage batteries
112 HR5557
To reduce temporarily
Nike (OR) Earl Blumenauer (OR) the rate of duty on
certain girls' shorts
112 HR4796
To extend the temporary
Hamilton Beach (VA) Bobby Scott (VA) suspension of duty on
electromechanical ice shavers
112 S2808
A bill to reduce temporarily
Reebok (MA) John Kerry (MA) the duty on
golf club driver heads
106 HR3704
To amend the Harmonized Tari
Mattel Inc (CA) Xavier Becerra (CA) Schedule of the United States
with respect to certain toys
109 S3313
A bill to reduce temporarily the duty
Honeywell Intl (NJ) Charles Schumer (NY) certain color monitors video with a
display diagonal of 35.56 cm or greater
Table 5: Lobby on Miscellaneous Tari Bills: This table shows that rms lobby for reducing
tari barriers on specic products. Also, there generally exists a high correlation between rm's
headquarter location and the sponsor state of each bill.
Tari reductions imply revenue loss. For example, Congressional Budget Oce estimated that all
tari reductions and suspensions introduced in \United States Manufacturing Enhancement Act
of 2010" (HR4380) alone will reduce tari revenue by $298 million in 10 years. This suggests that
open-trade-for-sale occurs. If protection-for-sale is the primary political mechanism through which
trade policy is determined as a result of lobbying, one should expect that rms would lobby for
protecting domestic market from their foreign competitors. Table 5 shows, however, that many
individual rms lobby for reducing tari on specic products they are concerned with.
Note that all bills in the table target very specic products, e.g., noise reducing headphones.
There were almost 2,000 miscellaneous tari bills introduced in 112th Congress alone. Ludema
et al. (2010) nds that about 79% of the miscellaneous bills introduced between 1999 and 2006
have become law. Given that only a verbal objection is needed to block the bill, however, they
argue that \protection for free" occurs. Simply put, protection can be cheaply accomplished by
expressing an objection rather than demanding it directly through lobbying. Nevertheless, it is
worth noting that most miscellaneous tari bills have encountered little objection from import-
competing rms. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of absence of the demands
for protection for dierentiated products. Furthermore, rms tend to lobby individually to reduce
taris on specic products rather than lobbying jointly together at the industry level. This suggests
35that each individual rm base their lobbying decision on their own cost-benet analysis rather than
lobbying together with other rms which requires them to overcome collective action problems.
This is also consistent with the theoretical prediction.
This section nds that there exist political pressures from rms to reduce trade barriers of
specic products. A close analysis of trade bills provides evidence that the contents of lobbied bills
are consistent with the theoretical predictions from Section 3. Certainly, examining words focusing
primarily on the sentences where they are used will not give a complete picture of the overarching
theme of a given bill. A bill generally covers a large number of issues reecting diverse political
interests and topics. As such, it might be that one part of a bill is promoting trade while other
parts are mainly focusing on introducing protective measures. To remedy this problem, I further
my analysis by tting unsupervised topic models on the texts of CRS summary of each bill. I nd
that a topic that characterized by a set of words such as certain, duty, treatment, and specific
is associated with frequent lobbying suggesting product-specic lobbying. This adds evidence of
product-specic lobbying. A detailed description of this analysis is available in Appendix 6.6.
4.5 Product Dierentiation and Trade Liberalization
This section examines whether tari policy varies across products with dierent degrees of sub-
stitutability. For the measure of product dierentiation (), I use the widely used measure from
Broda and Weinstein (2006).58 They estimate the elasticity-of-substitution for each HS10 product.
I take the average of their measure over each HS8 product category i in order to match the unit
at the legal tari line of the U.S. Each HS8 product is then categorized into three distinct levels
of product dierentiation: low (less than the 33th percentile), medium (between the 33th and the
58 The Model in Section 3 assumes quasi-linear preferences with a variable elasticity of substitution. In contrast,
Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimates elasticities under the assumption of CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
preferences. The measure is estimated based on a simple model of import demand and supply equations. Although
the functional form used in this paper is dierent from the CES utility function, the estimated  captures the exact
same idea of product dierentiation and it is the best proxy measure available in the literature.
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To determine if there are any systemic dierences in trade policies across products, I run a multilevel
model to estimate the average applied MFN tari rate (ijt) dierences across products with
dierent levels of dierentiation. This model is given in equation (12). The unit of analysis is HS8
manufacturing product i in NAICS6 industry j at year t. In order to address the concern that non-
tari barriers can function either as substitutes or complements to tari barriers, I include dummy
variables indicating whether a given HS8 product i has ever been subject to an anti-dumping (AD)
or countervaling duties (CVD) investigation using the TTBD database (Bown, 2012). I also control
for the value of total imports (value) and the number of exporting nations (cty) for each product.
Industry specic eects are modeled hierarchically by assuming that the mean of industry random
eects is a function of several industry level (NAICS6) covariates such as employment, value-added,
total-factor-productivity, payroll, and energy consumption using the information from Bartelsman
et al. (2000). The analysis is based on 92,267 observations (HS8 product i|NAICS6 industry j|
year t) from 1990 to 2005 with 7,670 unique manufacturing products and 373 NAICS6 industries.
Figure 15 presents a quasi-Bayesian simulation result based on the prediction of the model. It
shows that changing the level of product dierentiation from low (less than the 33th percentile) to
high (higher than the 66th percentile) category is associated with 0.4 percentage point decrease in
the applied MFN tari rate. This is equivalent to $124 million decrease in tari revenue.
The result provides empirical evidence that the U.S. had reduced tari barriers during the course
of the Uruguay Round negotiation, especially those of dierentiated products holding industry
level variation constant. That is, the stark increase in the within-industry variation in taris
after the Uruguay Round negotiation shown in Figure 1 is attributable to the tari reduction
of dierentiated products. This conrms the theoretical prediction. Specically, the multilateral
negotiation provided an opportunity for productive exporting rms to inform the government of
59 Broda and Weinstein (2006) uses the same strategy in order to address the potential measurement error in
estimating the level of product dierentiation. Dierent cut-o decisions do not change the result.
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Figure 15: Lower Taris on Dierentiated Products: This gure presents a quasi-Bayesian
simulation result based on the prediction of the model. It shows that changing the level of product
dierentiation from low to high category predicts that the applied MFN tari rate of the product
would decrease by 0.4 percentage point. Note that the time varying eect becomes more or less
constant since 1999 which is consistent with the phase-in period after the Uruguay Round.
their product-specic preferences. As a result, products with high levels of dierentiation received
larger tari reduction. It also suggests that counteracting demands for protection by import-
competing rms were not as strong as those on products that can be easily substitutable by cheap
foreign goods.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have shown that product dierentiation in economic market induces dierent
political incentives among rms within industry. My theory predicts that demand for trade liber-
alization will increase because high product dierentiation eliminates the collective action problem
exporting rms confront. On the other hand, political objections by import-competing rms to
product-specic liberalization will decline due to less substitutability and the possibility of serving
foreign markets based on the norms of reciprocity. With a new dataset on lobbying and trade bills,
I show that productive rms actively lobby on trade policy only when they produce dierentiated
products. I nd that goods that cannot be easily substitutable get lower applied taris on average.
Of course, the lobbying data cannot be used to directly test the causal mechanisms of this
theory. Successfully answering this question is likely to require survey methodologies that directly
38measure rm-level preferences or exploiting technological shocks on product dierentiation and
productivity at the rm-level. I leave for future research this challenging task of investigating how
exactly rm-level preferences translate into trade policy outcome.
The existence of political heterogeneity as well as taris dierences within industry may mean
that we need to call into question some of assumptions about what makes trade liberalization
possible. A vast majority of research on domestic politics of international trade is based on the
assumption that individual trade preferences are shaped by how trade aects their income, which
is tied directly to the industry they serve. However, recent research has found that most wage
inequality dispersion occurs within occupations and sectors rather than between occupations and
sectors (Helpman et al., 2010, 2012). A better understanding of rm's preferences on trade policy
may alter our view on political forces behind trade liberalization.
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6.1 Demand and Price under Oligopoly
 Taking rst order conditions of rms' problem in equation (4) gives
q1 =
1
2
(D   q2   q3   c1)
q2 =
1
2
(D   q1   q3   c2)
q3 =
1
2
(D   q1   q2   c3   )
q
1 =
1
2
(F   q
3   q
4   c1   )
q
3 =
1
2
(F   q
1   q
4   c3)
q
4 =
1
2
(F   q
1   q
3   c4): (13)
 Solving the above systems of equations gives optimal quantity of each product in respective
market.
q1 =
D(2   ) + ( + c2 + c3   c1)   2c1
2(2   )(1 + )
q2 =
D(2   ) + ( + c1 + c3   c2)   2c2
2(2   )(1 + )
q3 =
D(2   ) + (c1 + c2   c3   )   2(c3 + )
2(2   )(1 + )
q
1 =
F(2   ) + (c3 + c4   c1   )   2(c1 + )
2(2   )(1 + )
q
3 =
F(2   ) + ( + c4 + c1   c3)   2c3
2(2   )(1 + )
q
4 =
F(2   ) + ( + c1 + c3   c4)   2c4
2(2   )(1 + )
(14)
 Finally, combining equations (3) and (14), we have
p1 =
D(   2) + c1(22      2)   (c2 + c3 + )
2(2   )(1 + )
p2 =
D(   2) + c2(22      2)   (c1 + c3 + )
2(2   )(1 + )
p3 =
D(2   ) + c3(2 +    22) + (c1 + c2 +    2) + 2
2(2   )(1 + )
p
1 =
F(2   ) + c1(2 +    22) + (c3 + c4 +    2) + 2
2(2   )(1 + )
p
3 =
F(   2) + c3(22      2)   (c1 + c4 + )
2(2   )(1 + )
p
4 =
F(   2) + c4(22      2)   (c1 + c3 + )
2(2   )(1 + )
(15)6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof Intra-industry trade in physical quantity is
IIT() = q3 + q
1
=
2(c1 + c3 + 2) + (   2)(D + F)   (c2 + c4   2)
2(   2)( + 1)
Suppose 0  1 < 2 < 1
2, and let 1 = (1  2)(1 +1) and 2 = (2  2)(2 +1). First, we show
that 2   1 < 0.
2   1 = (2   2)(2 + 1)   (1   2)(1 + 1)
= (2   1)(2 + 1)   (2   1)
= (2   1)
| {z }
>0
(1 + 2   1)
| {z }
<0
< 0 (16)
Second, we show 12   21 > 0.
12   21 = 1(2
2   2   2)   2(2
1   1   2)
= 12(2   1) + 2(2   1) > 0 (17)
Finally, it is sucient to show that IIT() is monotonically decreasing for any 1 and 2 such that
0  1 < 2 < 1
2.
IIT(1)   IIT(2)
=
2(c1 + c3 + 2) + (1   2)(D + F)   1(c2 + c4   2)
2(1   2)(1 + 1)
 
2(c1 + c3 + 2) + (2   2)(D + F)   2(c2 + c4   2)
2(2   2)(2 + 1)
=
(2   1)(c1 + c3 + 2   D   F)
12
+
(12   21)(D + F   c2   c4 + 2)
212
> 0 (18)
, where the last inequality follows from equations (16), (17), and Assumption 1. This proves the result. 2
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof
First, Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide a useful methodology to characterize optimal
tari schedules of our game using the original result from Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Proof
for this well-known lemma is omitted.
Lemma 1 (G-H: Equilibrium Tariff Policy) (fLo
ig;o) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
if and only if
1. Lo
i is feasible for all i60
2. o maximizes (
P
i Li()) + aW()
60Here feasibility requires that each rm does not promise nonnegative oers that exceed their revenue3. o maximizes
i()   Li() +
X
i
Li() + aW()
4. for every j there exists  2 that maximizes (
P
i Li()) + aW() such that Lo
j() = 0
Now, we characterize the optimal tari schedule. From Condition 2 of Lemma(1),
X
i
@Li
@
(o) + a
@W
@
(o) = 0 (19)
Likewise, the government's maximization problem from Condition 3 of Lemma(1) gives,
@i
@
(o)  
@Li
@
(o) +
X
i
@Li
@
(o) + a
@W
@
(o) = 0 (20)
Combining equations (19) and (20) and summing over i gives the following equality.
X
i
@i
@
(o) =
X
i
@Li
@
(o) (21)
Substituting Equation(21) to Equation(19), we get
X
i
@i
@
(o) + a
@W
@
(o) = 0 (22)
Now, calculate each side of equation (22) from the prot functions of each rm and government.
@1
@
(o) =
(F   D + c2   c4 + 2)2 + 2(D   c3   c4 + 2) + 4(c1 +    F)
2( 2 + )2(1 + )2 (23)
@2
@
(o) =
(c1 + c3   c2   D + )2   2(c2   D)
2( 2 + )2(1 + )2 (24)
@3
@
(o) =
(D   F + c4   c2 + 2)2 + 2(c3   c1   c2 + 2   F) + 4(c3 +    D)
2( 2 + )2(1 + )2 (25)
@W
@
(o) =
(4D + 10 + 8c3   4c1   8c2)3
4( 2 + )2(1 + )2 +
(2F   15D + 7c1 + c2 + 15c3   2c4 + 21)2
4( 2 + )2(1 + )2
+
(3D + 2c1   6c3   c4   5)
( 2 + )2(1 + )2 +
(D   2F   5 + 2c1   5c3)
( 2 + )2(1 + )2 (26)
Therefore, plugging the results from equations (23), (24), (25), and (26) into equation (22) and
solve for o gives the optimal tari o.
o =
3 + 2 +  + 
10a3 + (10 + 21a)2 + (16   20a) + 16   20a
26.4 LASSO regression on CRS summary of Trade Bills
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Figure 16: cross validation: The left panel shows that log()   4 is found to minimize the
MSE. As shown in the right panel, most coecients are constrained to be zero around the value
of the chosen .
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(b) Placebo Test
Figure 17: Predicting the likelihood of Trade Bills Lobbied: Panel (a) presents the result
from the LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) method. It shows that there
exists distinct patterns in the frequency of words appearing in the CRS summaries that distinguish
bills that are not-lobbied and lobbied. Panel (b) shows the result from a placebo test whereby such
distinction disappears by reordering the bill-to-term matrix such that terms that are originally
from bill m becomes as if from bill n 6= m.6.5 Measures of Productivity
I measure productivity of rms after taking into account two important biases: Olley and Pakes
(1996) (O&P hereafter) point out simultaneity and selection biases. To begin, consider the following
production function for output y for rm i at year t, where K, L, M, and Z denotes capital, labor,
material, and a vector of control variables, respectively.
yit = 0 + kKit + `Lit + mMit + TZit + it: (27)
it = 'it + it (28)
First, a simultaneity bias may plague simple OLS regression to estimate productivity. Suppose
that rm level productivity 'it is known to each rm, and yet it is unobservable to a researcher. It
is reasonable to expect that any prot-maximizing rm will make input choices such as labor(L)
and material(M) according to their productivity level. That is, Lit = f('it) and Mit = g('it) with
some arbitrary function f and g. It becomes clear that a OLS regression will introduce simultaneity
biases due to the correlation between rms' unobserved productivity level and their input choices.
Specically, the correlation between input choices and productivity are positive, which creates an
upward biases to the coecients for input choices.
O&P also raise the issue of selection bias. Given that each rm makes a choice between exiting
or staying in operation, it is important to take into account that rms in the market fundamentally
dier from others. In particular, they may be inherently more productive than other rms who
have already exited or have not been able to enter at all. Assuming that rm's future prot is
increasing in its capital K, therefore, rms with little capital will stay in market only when they
are productive enough. This suggests that Corr('it;Kit) is negative, and therefore a simple OLS
estimates will underestimate the coecient of capital.
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), I estimated productivity of each rm in three steps. First,
I assume that input choices such as labor and material are aected by productivity 'it, while the
decision on capital is based only on past productivity. I also assume that a proxy variable iit such
as investment is strictly increasing in Kit.61 These two assumptions imply that one can invert the
investment and input choice functions to get the following.
'it =  it(iit;Kit): (29)
Substituing equation (29) into equation (27) gives,
yit = 0 + kKit + `Lit + mMit + TZit +  it(iit;Kit) + it
= 0 + `Lit + mMit + TZit + it(iit;Kit) + it: (30)
Now, equation (30) can be estimated with consistent estimates of `, m and T, where () is
estimated with a second order polynomial in investment and capital.
The second step estimates survival probability in order to address the selection issue. That
is, I assume that a rational rm chooses to be in the market only when its productivity is high
enough.62 The survival probability is estimated by running a probit model of a binary indicator of
being in the market in year t on iit 1, and Kit 1 with their cross products. Denote the predicted
probability from the second step by b it.
61 A detailed discussion of the estimation is quite involved. Interested reader is advised to read the original paper
of O&P.
62 The decision to exit is assumed to follow a rst-order Markov process.Variable O&P OLS
capital 0.092 0.078
(0.028) (0.004)
labor 0.210 0.224
(0.015) (0.006)
material 0.851 0.812
(0.017) (0.005)
year 0.004 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
foreign 0.003 -0.034
(0.020) (0.010)
N 23487
Table 6: Production function estimation: The rst col-
umn summaries the estimates of production function based
on the method proposed by Olley & Pakes (O&P). This cor-
rects the (1) simultaneity and (2) selection biases in rm level
input choices and exiting decision. As expected, the coe-
cient of capital is underestimated in OLS while labor input
choice is overestimated. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Note: Standard errors in O&P model are bootstrapped using
250 replications.
Signicant at 1% level.
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Figure 18: Productivity on Lobbying: there
exists a positive correlation between productivity of
rms and their political contribution. Political contri-
bution at the y-axis is measured by logged total lob-
bying expenditure by each rm. This is an important
nding on rm-level political behavior consistent with
the new-new trade theory of heterogeneous rms.
The nal step ts the following equation to get the consistent estimates of the production
function, where  is approximated by a second order polynomial function.
yit   b `Lit   b mMit = kKit + b TZit + (b it 1   kKit 1; c it) + 'it   'it 1 + it: (31)
Using the estimated coecient, we get the estimated total factor productivity of each rm by
tfpit = yit   b kKit   b `Lit   b mMit   b TZit: (32)
Table 6 compares the results from two production function estimation, where we use net sale for
yit, and year and foreign rm indicator as Zit.63 As expected, OLS underestimates the coecient
for capital, while it overestimates the eect of labor inputs than the ones based on Olley & Pakes
(O&P) method.64
In order to test the validity of the productivity measure used in this paper, I compare how
two alternative measures of productivity used in the literature explain the employment level of
each manufacturing rm in the U.S. market. Panel (a) of Figure 19 is based on a measure dened
in equation (32), while that of Panel (b) is based on an alternative productivity measure used
in the current literature.65 We expect a positive relationship between the employment level and
productivity of each rm. In fact, as Bernard et al. (2007a) empirically shows, more productive
rms are more likely to export, be bigger, pay higher wages to their employees, and make larger
prots. As it clearly shows, the measure correcting for the two biases in Panel (a) explains the
63 I used STATA's opreg package to estimate the production function.
64 I get higher estimates for material input. This is due in large part to the lack of data on rm level wages.
Currently, I use estimates from Bartelsman et al. (2000) for industry level average wages. I dene material as \cost
of goods" plus \administrative and selling expenses" less \deprecation" less \employment expenses".
65 I take the productivity measure used in Kuno and Naoi (2012) and Ploue (2012) because these are only
empirical works using rm level productivity in IPE to the best of my knowledge. The measure is dened as
ATFP = ln
Q
L   sln
K
L following Head and Ries (2003), where Q is total revenue, L is number of employees, and K
is a proxy for capital. s is arbitrarily set to 1=3.employment level better than the other measure in Panel (b). Moreover, higher productivity is
associated positively with bigger lobbying expenditure as Figure 18 shows. The next section will
further investigate whether productive exporting rms are in fact more likely to lobby.
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(a) Productivity Measure based on O&P
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(b) Alternative Productivity Measure
Figure 19: Productivity and Employment Level: This gure illustrates the validity of the
productivity measure used in this paper. The productivity used in Panel (a) is dened in equa-
tion (32). The alternative measure in Panel (b) is dened as ln(Q=L)   1
3ln(K=L). Note that the
recent development of new-new trade theory suggests a strong positive relationship between pro-
ductivity and employment level. However, the alternative measure used in the literature is unable
to explain the employment level of each rm compared to the one in Panel (a).
6.6 Topic Models Applied to Trade Bills
I assume that a given bill has a probability distribution over \topics", where each topic can be
characterized as a distribution over words. For example, suppose that there are ve topics that
generally describe the universe of trade bills: 1) free trade agreement, 2) miscellaneous tari bill,
3) fast-tract authority for president, 4) appropriations bill, and 5) protection bill. To the extent
that a single bill contains one or more than one of these topics, a bill can be characterized as a
probability distribution over these topics, e.g., 70% free trade agreement with 30% protection where
the latter reects the concerns of import-competing industries in the face of free trade agreement.
Secondly, a topic is a probability distribution over words because free trade agreement topic might
have more frequent use of words such as agreement, tari, president, import and export, etc than
appropriations topic.66 This will help us characterize each bill in terms of the distribution over
topics, which will be subsequently used to link to the occurrence of lobbying.
I t topic models with 5 to 20 topics. Using the one topic model as a baseline, I chose a model
with highest Bayes factor to determine the number of topics.67 This gives the 8 topic model.
Figure 20 graphically summarizes the distribution over the 8 topics for each bill categorizing non-
66See Blei et al. (2003) for a more formal description of Latent dirichlet allocation topic models used in this section.
67 For N topic model MN, Bayes factor is calculated based by computing the following quantity
Pr(DjMN)
Pr(DjM1) =
R
Pr(NjMN) Pr(DjN;MN) dN R
Pr(1jM1) Pr(Dj1;M1) d1 , where D is observed data,  is model parameters.Topics
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Figure 20: Distribution over Topics and Lobbying: This gure summarizes the distribution
over 8 trade-related topics for each bill. Lines with darker shade in each column implies that a
given bill is highly associated with the given topic. It shows that Topic 2 and Topic 4 are useful in
distinguishing lobbied (green) and non-lobbied bills (red).
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Figure 21: Distribution over Words in 8 Topics: This gure presents top 30 words associated
with each of the 8 topics. The size is proportional to the loading sizes of each word.
lobbied (red & above 400) and lobbied bills (green & below 400) separately. I check whether there
exists dierences between lobbied and non-lobbied bills. It shows that both kinds of bills are heavily
loaded with Topic 1. This is not surprising in that each bill is trade-related and the rst topic
concerns general \trade" as a topic. Compared to Topic 1, Topic 2 and Topic 4 jointly separate
the occurrence of lobbying better. In other words, bills with more weights on the two topics tend
to get lobbied more.Figure 21 displays top 30 words associated with each topic. A close examination of Topic 2
and the bills that have the highest loading on the topic suggests that this topic is related to either
the fast-track authority bills that grant president an authority to negotiate trade agreements or
various bilateral trade agreements themselves, e.g., \United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act" (HR3080). Note that countries negotiate over tari and non-tari barriers
on highly dierentiated products during the course of trade agreements. Topic 4 is related to
appropriation bill that authorizes the government to spend money. Most frequent examples include
appropriation bills to fund Export-Import Bank of the U.S. and their export nancing program to
promote U.S. exports abroad, e.g., \Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2006" (S3938).
To be sure, this is not to argue that all lobbying activities associated with the bills can be
considered as pro-trade lobbying. Admittedly, lobbying on liberal trade bills may occur as much
to oppose as to support it to be passed. However, the evidence provided in this section strongly
suggests that 1) rms are important political actors, 2) they often lobby on specic products, and
3) there exists a pattern that distinguishes between lobbied and non-lobbied trade bills.6.7 An Example of Lobbying Report
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the Trans Pacific Partnership FTA. Possible future FTA with Egypt.
Figure 22: 4th Quarter Lobbying Report by Chrysler in 2011